THE EFFECT OF ORGANIZATIONAL TURBULENCE
ON COMPANIES IN SUSTAINMENT BRIGADES

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This study investigates the effect organizational turbulence caused by frequent changes in task organization has on the company sized elements resident in the sustainment brigades. The study identifies the modular structure of the sustainment brigade, the ARFORGEN process, and the sourcing process as factors contributing to the current level of organizational turbulence experienced by these companies. It also examines how this turbulence negatively affects unit training, leader development and unit development. The methodology that is used is a modification of the U.S. Army's Seven Step Problem-Solving Model. This methodology critically examines potential solutions using a rubric-based set of benchmarks. Courses of action were evaluated for cost, stability, flexibility and effectiveness. The study concludes that restricting modularity to the battalion level and adding geography as a planning consideration for the sourcing process greatly reduces the level of organizational turbulence. By adopting these changes, the conditions will be set for enhanced unit training, leader development and unit development.

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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECT OF ORGANIZATIONAL TURBULENCE ON COMPANIES IN SUSTAINMENT BRIGADES, by Major James L. Dobrinska II, 91 pages.

This study investigates the effect organizational turbulence caused by frequent changes in task organization has on the company sized elements resident in the sustainment brigades. The study identifies the modular structure of the sustainment brigade, the ARFORGEN process, and the sourcing process as factors contributing to the current level of organizational turbulence experienced by these companies. It also examines how this turbulence negatively affects unit training, leader development and unit development. The methodology that is used is a modification of the U.S. Army's Seven Step Problem-Solving Model. This methodology critically examines potential solutions using a rubric-based set of benchmarks. Courses of action were evaluated for cost, stability, flexibility and effectiveness. The study concludes that restricting modularity to the battalion level and adding geography as a planning consideration for the sourcing process greatly reduces the level of organizational turbulence. By adopting these changes, the conditions will be set for enhanced unit training, leader development and unit development.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ACRONYMS

ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
COA	Course Of Action
CSS	Combat Service Support
CSSB	Combat Sustainment Support Battalion
EAB	Echelons Above Brigade
EFP	Expeditionary Force Package
ESC	Expeditionary Sustainment Command
FM	Field Manual
FORSCOM	Forces Command
HQ	Headquarters
QM	Quartermaster
STB	Special Troops Battalion
TDY	Temporary Duty
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TSC	Theater Sustainment Command
UIC	Unit Identification Code
URF	Unit Requirements Form

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

At Present in the United States Army, company commanders in sustainment brigades often have three or more different battalion commanders during a command tour. The reason for this high level of organizational turbulence is the highly modular structure of sustainment brigades, coupled with how unit readiness is managed and how requirements are sourced to meet the needs of the combatant commanders. This study investigates the impacts that the frequent changes in task organization have on the company sized elements resident in the sustainment brigades. To do this, the study presents a brief history of modularity, a broad overview of the current Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, sourcing models as they relate to the units of the sustainment brigade, and the impacts that the constant turbulence of change have had on unit training, leader development and unit development. This study presents several options for correcting or limiting the negative impact that organizational turbulence has had on the company level units of the sustainment brigades in an era of persistent conflict.

The ramifications of the dynamic relationship between frequent changes in task organization and leader development, organizational development and unit training has not yet been studied, but it is clear that the organizational turbulence caused by the frequent changes in task organization presents a less than optimal environment for leader and organizational development and unit training in many company sized units that are part of the sustainment brigade.

Thesis

Reducing the current level of organizational turbulence experienced by the companies of the sustainment brigade would set the conditions for enhanced leader development, unit training, and organizational development without significantly impacting the flexibility required to support the combatant commander.

Background

There are three primary factors affecting the level of organizational turbulence, these are the modular structure of the sustainment brigades, how unit readiness is managed ARFORGEN, and how requirements are sourced in support of Expeditionary Force Packages (EFP). In addition, one secondary factor, transformation, has enhanced the impact of all three primary factors. To gain a full appreciation of the potential issues resulting from the organizational turbulence associated with frequent changes in task organization, it is necessary to give a brief description of each contributing factor and how they affect the level of organizational turbulence.

Implementation of Modularity

In order to fully appreciate the modular structures of the sustainment brigades, it is important to understand the reasons why the Army decided to design them in this manner. In units above the brigade level, it has been the practice for companies to be assigned to a battalion without being organic (a permanent part of) to the battalion dating back to the end of the Second World War. It is unclear where this type of task organization originated, but the implication is that it would have been possible for these units to be task organized as needed to meet the requirements of the combatant

commander. While this is an example of modularity, the term was not used at the time. (Note: the sustainment brigade is an Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) unit but it did not exist until the last round of transformation which will be explained later in this chapter).

In 1991, the US Army conducted a deployment in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Although Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was widely considered a success, one of the key lessons learned was that the Army was too heavy and slow to deploy. Furthermore, due to the structure of the Army at the time, capabilities that were not required deployed to the conflict, which tied up key lift assets and needlessly slowed the deployment sequence.

In order to address the issue of needlessly deploying unneeded capabilities as was the often the case with the force structure at the time, the modular concept was developed. On 10 January 1995, the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published TRADOC Pamphlet 525-68, *Concept for Modularity*. TRADOC defined modularity as "a force design methodology which establishes a means of providing force elements that are interchangeable, expandable, and tailorable to meet the changing needs of the Army."[1]

The organizational flexibility of a modular force was viewed as a way to face a post- Cold War future that would require the Army to "deal with force strength constraints, limits on available forces, dollar constraints, and limits on strategic lift required to transport the necessary capability into theater."[2] The modularity concept

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[1]Headquarters, TRADOC, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-68 *Military Operations, Concept for Modularity* (Fort Monroe, VA: 10 January 1995), 1, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p5.doc (accessed 25 December 2009).

[2]Ibid., 1.

would permit detaching capabilities and functions from a parent unit and attaching these capabilities for deployment with a second unit, tailored to meet the needs of the mission.

With the publishing of 525-68, EAB modularity became a formal practice. If this was so, why was the issue of organizational turbulence not brought to light? The answer is twofold. First, from 1995 until 2001 there wasn't an enduring conflict that truly pushed the limits of the modular force. Second, prior to the last round of transformation, Corps Support Commands were aligned with a particular corps which limited modularity and by extension, the level of organizational turbulence.

<u>Army Transformation's Impact on Modularity</u>

How did alignment of a Corps Support Command with a corps limit modularity's impact on organizational turbulence? Alignment, such as the example of the 1st Corps Support Command being aligned with the 18th Airborne Corps meant that requirements from an 18th Airborne Corps subordinate would be filled by a Corps Support Group, a subordinate of the 1st Corps Support Command. These Corps Support Groups had over time developed a habitual relationship with a division from the 18th Airborne Corps largely due to geography. As a result, when a force package was required, the companies and the battalion usually came from within the same Corps Support Group. This somewhat limited modularity, and offered more staff oversight of training management and resources. It was when the Army transitioned to a brigade-centric force and created the Sustainment Brigade, which was not aligned with either a division or a brigade that the conditions were present for increased modularity. When coupled with the requirements of supporting a persistent conflict this increased modularity has led to an increase in organizational turbulence.

Within the sustainment brigade, companies with the functions of financial management , human resources, field services, supply, transportation, and maintenance are assigned to a Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB) or the Special Troops Battalion (STB) (see figure 1). As a result of not being organic (permanent part of) to a battalion level headquarters (HQ), these companies are routinely moved from battalion to battalion as the units within the brigade move through the ARFORGEN Process.

Figure 1.   Sustainment Brigade Organization Chart
Source: Created by author, derived from Department of the Army, Field Manual Intermediate (FMI) 3-0.1, *The Modular Force* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1-14.

Managing Unit Readiness, the ARFORGEN Process

In order to understand how the ARFORGEN process affects units in the sustainment brigades it is necessary to be familiar with how the process works. ARFORGEN was developed to meet the demands of winning the current "Long War" conflict over a protracted period. The ARFORGEN process is based upon the brigade

combat team (BCT) instead of the division and builds combat power in four phases: reset, train and ready, available, and deployment (see figure 2).

Figure 2.　　ARFORGEN Process

Source: LTC Frank J. Gonzales, "Army Force Generation" (LandWarNet Conference Presentation, Army Force Generation, 2007).

The reset phase begins on the unit's date of return from deployment, which is defined as the date on which 51 percent of the unit has returned to home station. While in this phase, the unit will be shown as C5 (not mission capable) in the unit status report for 180 calendar days (the as length of the phase). During this phase, units should conduct the following: reintegration (usually immediately upon return and is a requirement before block leave), block leave, and individual training. It is also during this time that units will have the highest level of personnel turbulence as Soldiers will have a Permanent Change

of Station in and out of the unit. As a result, for most of this phase unit manning will be at its lowest level. As for equipment, during this time the unit will receive equipment needed for training. When units return from deployment, they are stabilized for 90 days; Soldiers get time with their families prior to being reassigned to units that are in later stages of ARFORGEN. This also ensures that the unit will have sufficient end strength to conduct training. While this may work well within the BCT, it does not always work within the sustainment brigade due to the fact that most of the brigade is not on the same ARFORGEN cycle, which has a limiting effect on the ability to conduct a brigade level training exercise at the conclusion of this phase. As a result, brigade elements often do not conduct brigade level training until the end of the train/ready phase or the beginning of the available phase, often requiring significant temporary duty (TDY) travel.

After the reset phase comes the train/ready phase, which the Department of the Army describes as follows:

> Units are assessed as ready to conduct mission preparation and higher level collective training with other operational headquarters for upcoming missions. Train/Ready force pool units are eligible for sourcing, may be mobilized if required, and can be committed, if necessary, to meet operational (surge) requirements.[3]

In sustainment brigade units, it is at this point that the impact of being on multiple ARFORGEN timelines begins to take effect. Training that was not accomplished in the previous phase will have to be accomplished in the train and ready phase or skipped altogether. If the former, the quality of the training will suffer due to time constraints. If the later, it will have lasting impacts on the unit's state of training when it deploys. It is in the later portion of the train and ready phase that sustainment brigade units begin to task

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[3]Ibid.

organize for deployment. As the battalion task organizes for deployment, companies not

scheduled for deployment are attached to a different battalion within the brigade. For

example, figure 3 shows that the finance and human resources companies that were

originally task organized under the STB (on the left) are now attached to the (CSSB) (on

the right) as the STB prepares for the available phase. These companies may be attached

to at least one more battalion HQ prior to deployment if they are not in the same

ARFORGEN phase as the CSSB that they are attached to.

Figure 3.   Change in Task Organization Example
Source: Created by author, derived from Department of the Army, Field Manual
Intermediate (FMI) 3-0.1, *The Modular Force* (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 2008), 1-14.

Next is the available phase, in this phase units are available for deployment.

"Units will be sourced against operational (Deployed Expeditionary Force Package) or

contingency (Contingency Expeditionary Force Package) requirements."[4]

At the conclusion of this phase, the unit will deploy in support of contingency

operations. If the unit does not deploy within 180 days of assuming this phase, the unit

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[4]Ibid.

will be placed in the reset phase and repeat the cycle, although given the current pace of operations, this would be the exception rather than the rule.

Field Manual (FM) 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, states that "a key tenet of ARFORGEN is that home station training responsibilities remain more static than dynamic to minimize command and control turbulence before deployment." [5] This tenet is routinely violated in the sustainment brigades by companies being assigned to multiple battalions in a given year. The effect of multiple task organization changes places increased responsibility on company-sized units to plan, coordinate, and synchronize pre-deployment training without the benefit of a staff and often without the required experience. Why is this?

In many cases, the battalions that these companies are attached to are involved in planning their own pre-deployment training or have just returned from a deployment, in which case they would be experiencing personnel turbulence as part of reset. FM 7-0 provides a potential partial solution stating, "Force Package commanders normally influence the training of units projected for assignment or attachment to the force package by exercising coordinating authority, once delegated, with the providing commander." [6] If a force package commander did provide guidance and direction to a company level commander, this would synchronize training with that of the deploying force package, but the truth is that this doesn't work very well, often due to cost and time available. In an interview MAJ Howard, Former Executive Officer of the STB-1st

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[5]Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 4-15.

[6]Ibid.

Sustainment Brigade, clearly describes the difficulty of managing the pre-deployment training of units identified as part of his force package. "Pre-deployment training was an issue. The battalion chain of command was able to do some coordination and actually meet with the company chains of command. The only ability to track the training was no more than checklist deep."[7]

The Sourcing Process

The last of the three factors that contribute to the organizational turbulence experienced by the companies of the sustainment brigade is the process in which units are sourced in support of identified requirements. The first step in the process is for the geographical combatant commander to submit requirements which in turn are validated by joint forces command who forward the requirement to the appropriate branch of service. For Army requirements, Forces Command (FORSCOM) will validate the requirement and then identify possible units and possible sourcing solutions which are screened to ensure that they are supportable. It is during this screening that FORSCOM planners determine if the requirement can be met at the major subordinate command level, the "Patch Level" (this is usually a brigade level structure with its associated subordinate units), or the unit identification code (UIC) Level (see figure 4).

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[7]MAJ Lowell Howard, Oral history interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 March 2010.

Figure 4.   Sourcing Process

Source: US Department of the Army, G3/5/7, Student Text 25 (Information Briefing, Washington, DC, April 2009)

Once it has been determined how the requirements will be sourced, the recommended sourcing solution is posted to the Army Sourcing Laydown, where all recommendations are analyzed to ensure their suitability. If no issues are discovered, the FORSCOM G3 will approve the sourcing recommendations and the sourcing process owner will publish a warning order. If a reclama (a request made to the authority to reconsider its decision) is not received from any of the units involved, the sourcing process owner will coordinate for the release of the execution order.

A sample ribbon chart in figure 5 shows how the modular structure of the sustainment brigade, the ARFORGEN process, and the sourcing process create organizational turbulence. This chart tracks several units through the ARFORGEN process and displays the decisions from the sourcing process to illustrate where the organizational turbulence experienced by the units within the Sustainment Brigade occurs. The Ribbon Chart in figure 5 is a recreation of an actual sustainment brigade in

Fiscal Year 2009; however the unit names and UICs have been changed in order to prevent this document from being classified secret.

	UIC	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
123 Sustainment Brigade	WH9TAA	Deployed (OIF)		Reset			Train/Ready						
STB	WH9TAB	Deployed (OIF)		Reset			Train/Ready						
HHC	WH9TA1	Deployed (OIF)		Reset			Train/Ready						
B Co (Sig)	WH9TA2	Deployed (OIF)		Reset			Train/Ready						
12th QM (AD)	WJ9SAA	Available											
95th HR	WP8SAA	Reset		Train/Ready									Available
Postal Plans and Ops	WP8SAB	Deployed (OIF)						Reset		Train/Ready			
R5 Platoon	WP8SAC	Deployed(OEF)		Reset			Train/Ready						
Casualty Platoon	WP8SAD	Deployed (OEF)							Reset		Train/Ready		
Cas 1	WP8SA1	Reset	Train/Ready						Available			Deployed (OIF)	
Cas 2	WP8SA2	Available	Deployed (OEF)										
Cas 3	WP8SA3	Deployed (OIF)		Reset			Train/Ready						
Cas 4	WP8SA4	Deployed (OIF)						Reset		Train/Ready			
1st Postal Plt	WP8SAE	Train/Ready		Available		Deployed (OIF)							
2nd Postal Plt	WP8SAF	Train/Ready		Available			Deployed (OEF)						
3rd Postal Plt	WP8SAG	Deployed (OEF)		Reset			Train/Ready						
12 FMC	WM9TAA	Deployed (OIF)		Reset			Train/Ready						
A Det FMC	WM9TAB	Deployed (OEF)		Reset			Train/Ready						
B Det FMC	WM9TAC	Train/Ready								Available	Deployed (OIF)		
C Det FMC	WM9TAD	Deployed (OIF)					Reset		Train/Ready				
432 CSSB	WH8RAA	Reset		Train/Ready									Available
21 QM	WH9PAA	Deployed (OIF)		Reset			Train/Ready						
23 QM	WH7MAA	Reset		Train/Ready									Available
45 ORD	WH9WAA	Train/Ready						Available		Deployed (OEF)			
592 Trans	WM7SAA	Deployed (OIF)											Reset
532 CSSB	WP8DAA	Deployed (OEF)					Reset			Train/Ready			
31 QM	WD6TAA	Deployed (OIF)						Reset		Train/Ready			
33 QM	WM9CAA	Deployed (OIF)		Reset			Train/Ready						
55 Trans	WJ8VAA	Train/Ready								Available	Deployed (OIF)		
925 Trans	WP9DAA	Deployed (OEF)										Reset	

Figure 5.   Sample Ribbon Chart
Source: Created by author.

The ribbon chart in figure 5 displays the level of organizational turbulence in the units of the 123 Sustainment Brigade. The STB's organic units (HQ and HQ Company and B Company) which are in the same cycle as their parent battalion and brigade, clearly have much less organizational turbulence than the other depicted companies. This additional stability provides a better environment for leader and organizational development. These organic companies have the advantage of having their reset and train up for the next deployment coordinated between two staffs that have the necessary

resources to do so. In addition, the conditions are better set for unit training by allowing the organic companies to participate in all mission rehearsal exercises.

Another example is the 95th Human Resources Company. Figure 5 shows that this company has a total of eleven UICs, most of which are on different ARFORGEN cycles. Having a company with multiple platoon and squad sized elements on different deployment cycles makes unit training as well as leader and organizational development difficult.

The question that comes to mind when looking at the example of the 33rd QM or the 95th Human Resources Company is what impact is there on training for these units as they prepare for their next deployment? Keeping in mind that FM 7-0 states "modular organizations require a higher degree of training and operational synchronization at the brigade level"[8] and the level of turbulence that we have discussed in the example of the 123rd Sustainment Brigade, it is safe to assume that the conditions for training are less than optimal.

<u>Purpose (Problem Statement)</u>

The frequent changes in task organization experienced by the company level units of the sustainment brigades have resulted in organizational turbulence which presents a less than optimal environment for unit training, leader development and organizational development. The purpose of this study is to investigate options which would reduce the level of organizational turbulence experienced by the companies of the sustainment brigade and enhance unit training, leader development, and organizational development.

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[8]Department of the Army, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, 4-12.

Proposed Research Question

How are modularity, the ARFORGEN process, and the Army sourcing process contributing to organizational turbulence in company sized units within sustainment brigades?

Sub Question

How is this organizational turbulence affecting unit training, leader development, and organizational development in these units?

Second Sub Question

Could modifications in modularity and such measures as permanently assigning some units to battalion level HQ lessen the impacts of modularity while still meeting the requirements of the Combatant Commander?

Assumptions Made Prior to the Study

1. There are three primary factors affecting the level of organizational turbulence: the modular structure of the sustainment brigades, how unit readiness is managed (ARFORGEN), and how requirements are sourced in support of (EFPs). In addition, one secondary factor, transformation, enhanced the impact of all three primary factors.

2. The frequent changes in task organization have had a negative effect on the development of junior officers and non-commissioned officers.

3. This issue is prevalent in Sustainment Brigades across the Army.

4. Permanent assignment of these companies to a battalion would alleviate many of these issues.

5. A Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities solution will be required to resolve this issue.

Scope and Limitations

This study analyzes the impact that frequent changes in task organization have had on the units within the sustainment brigades with respect to leader development, unit training, and organizational development. Analysis is restricted to that of the sustainment brigades. Furthermore, the analysis does not consider elements above brigade outside of force sustainment (QM, transportation, ordinance, signal, human resources, and finance units that are typically resident in sustainment brigades). This dynamic may exist in these formations but considering them is beyond the scope of this study.

Importance of the Study

What can the Army gain from this investigation? Ideally, this investigation will clearly and convincingly outline the need for changes in how force sustainment units are organized and deployed. Currently, the level of organizational turbulence caused by frequent changes in task organization does not offer an optimal environment for leader development, organizational development, and unit training. From this study, it is hoped that in addition to bringing these issues to light, that a viable solution or solutions will be provided.

Part of this study focuses on the effect that transformation had on sustainment brigades. One of the goals of transformation was to build a more modular force which could be deployed as an EFP tailored to meet the specific demands of the current mission. While this approach has gained the Army much efficiency, modularity may have limits,

which the case of the companies found within sustainment brigades may illustrate. This study does not criticize the modularity concept. It is undertaken with the view that an investigation into possibly excessive modularity will prove valuable to the Army.

Qualifications

In my last assignment, I served as the Battalion Executive Officer in the Special Troops Brigade of the 82nd Sustainment Brigade. During this time I observed non-organic companies being shifted from one battalion to another when that battalion received deployment orders. The norm was that a battalion with deploying orders would transfer all non deploying units 120 days prior to deployment to allow that battalion to focus exclusively on pre deployment training. What I observed in these units that passed from unit to unit was higher rates of indiscipline, lower morale as well as lower duty proficiency. This of course varied from unit to unit based largely on the capabilities of the company commander and first sergeant. It is my belief that every effort needs to be made to stem the level of organizational turbulence currently experienced by these units in order to enhance unit training and foster leader and organizational development. Without these changes, I see this trend becoming more pronounced as we continue the current rate of operations and at the same time continue the trend of less and less experienced company commanders which does not posture our forces for success.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

A relatively small number of documents exist dealing with the organizational

turbulence faced by the companies of sustainment brigades as a result of frequent

changes in task organization. In chapter 1, modularity, ARFORGEN, and the sourcing

process were identified as primary factors contributing to organizational turbulence,

while transformation was identified as having enhanced the effect of modularity. In

addition, it was suggested that the organizational turbulence currently being experienced

within the sustainment brigades offer a less than optimal environment for unit training,

leader development, and organizational development. This chapter looks at articles that

address all three primary contributing factors, transformation as a secondary factor, as

well as the three areas identified as being impacted. However, it is helpful to group

several of these topics such as modularity with transformation, ARFORGEN with the

sourcing process, and leader and organizational development due to the fact that they are

interrelated. The last item, unit training will be addressed alone. Through examination of

this literature it is possible to trace the thought process which led to establishing the

systems currently in place as well as what is being said by those who have seen the

sustainment brigades first hand. In addition, oral history interviews have been conducted

with MAJ Lowell Howard and LTC Robert Brem with informed consent provided via

email. These officers, having served in sustainment brigades both deployed and in

garrison, offer insights into the issue of organizational turbulence, its causes and some

potential solutions. That being said, the focus of gathering this data is to build support for answering the problem statement for this study.

Studies Related to Modularity and Transformation

In an article published in *Army Logistician*, COL Williams, former commander of the 3rd Sustainment Brigade, addresses the challenges faced when trying to conduct pre-deployment training such as building a cohesive team which he referred to as "habitual Linkage."[9] Building a habitual relationship has a synergistic effect that increases the proficiency of the whole task force, but is currently hindered by geographical separation, at times equipment and personnel shortages, and lack of designed Combat Training Center training for logistics units above the brigade level. It is the intent that an EFP will train together during the available phase which would help in developing the habitual linkage that COL Williams is referring to, but to do so is at times cost prohibitive due to the fact that elements of this force package are likely coming from several different military installations. A secondary problem caused by having a geographically diverse EFP is additional time away from home prior to deployment which only adds to the strain already felt by Army families.

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[9]COL Darrell Williams, MAJ Geoffrey Detingo, and Rae Lynn Michelle Graham, "Training Strategies for Sustainment Brigades and Echelons-Above-Brigade Logistics Units," *Army Logistician* (September-October 2007): 3-5.

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│ Research Idea:  Would a concerted effort to build Expeditionary │
│ Force Packages comprised of units from the same military      │
│ installation increase the efficiency of the units involved while also │
│ cutting down on the required time away from families?         │
│                                                               │
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Figure 6.   Research Idea 1

Source: Created by author.

In a second article authored by COL Williams, he demonstrates the vital role

played by the STB in a deployed environment. One of the key missions that he outlined

for the STB was the command and control of human resources and financial management

companies that were dispersed throughout the sustainment brigade's area of operation in

Iraq.

> The 3d STB was spread out over 23 different FOBs and COBs throughout MND–
> N [Multi-National Division North] and MND-West [Multi-National Division
> West] and comprised over 800 Soldiers and Airmen. Command and control of
> these diverse mission sets presented a challenge.[10]

This challenge faced by the STB was compounded by the fact that the financial

management and postal companies were attached just prior to deployment, leaving little

time for the battalion commander to establish a working relationship prior to deployment.

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[10]COL Darrell Williams, LTC Lillard D. Evans, and CPT Brittany R. Warren,
"Modular Transformation and the 3d Sustainment Brigade," *Army Logistician* (January–
February 2009): 8-10.

> **Research Idea**: Could much of the "Habitual Relationship" issue be solved by simply adjusting the sourcing process to allow companies to deploy with battalions from their parent Sustainment Brigade, thereby allowing these units to task organize earlier in the ARFORGEN Process? In the case of Human Resources and Financial Management Companies, would permanent assignment to the STB eliminate this issue?

Figure 7.　　Research Idea 2

Source: Created by author.

In looking at the ARFORGEN process, it is important to keep in mind that this process was designed around the BCTs, and that most of the units in the sustainment brigade while assigned, are not organic, meaning that they will not always deploy with the brigade. The sustainment brigades were designed this way in order to be more modular, so that the CSSBs can be specifically tailored to meet the requirements of a given contingency. This approach it was believed would offer a more flexible and efficient structure than what was offered by the Army of Excellence structure. In an interview, MG Stevenson the Commanding General of the Army Combined Arms Support Command addressed the issue of modularity relating to leader development,

> Similarly, Sustainment Brigades are not likely to deploy with the CSSBs they command and control at home station, nor are the CSSBs likely to deploy with all of their subordinate companies. This makes it critically important to know how to quickly build relationships with a new higher headquarters and with new customers. It's essential for the sustainment brigade commander to recognize this and then to teach and mentor CSSB and company commanders on how to build these relationships.[11]

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[11]MG Mitchell H. Stevenson, "Thoughts for Sustainment Brigade Commanders: An Interview With the CASCOM Commanding General," *Army Logistician* (September–October 2007): 1-2.

MG Stevenson's idea that developing the skill set of quickly building

relationships is vital is easy to agree with, but it would seem that this skill is much easier

to cultivate at the brigade or battalion level where the key leaders (battalion commander

and command sergeant major) all have in excess of 15 years of experience. This becomes

much more of a risk at the company level where the average company commander has

between three and five years of experience.

Research Idea: Is there a point at which being modular causes more problems than it solves? If so, where is that point? At the company level? At the platoon level?

Figure 8. Research Idea 3

Source: Created by author.

An extreme example of modularity is given in an article written by CPT Wulf,

Battalion S1 for the STB-1st Sustainment Brigade. She describes the following situation:

> The 1st Sustainment Brigade had a casualty platoon that was from one active component unit while its 5 subordinate teams were from 4 different reserve component units. That required 6 separate units with 6 separate unit identification codes deploying at different times from 5 different locations to build 1 platoon of 27 Soldiers.[12]

> In this same article, CPT Wulf also made a strong case for structural changes in

the Postal Company that would alleviate some of the span of control problems of the

company commander.

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[12]CPT Xarhya Wulf, "Human Resources Modularity Tested in Iraq," *Army Logistician* (July-August 2009): 42-46.

An article written by CPT Amos, Human Resources Plans Officer, 3rd

Sustainment Brigade, outlined a very similar issue:

> Under the modular concept, the 101st Human Resources Company headquarters
> deployed without its plans and operations section or any of the detachments and
> teams that it had habitual relationships with at Fort Campbell. Instead, the
> company, which was made up of detachments and teams from a variety of human
> resources units from across the continental United States and Europe, fell in on
> the plans and operations section of the 502nd Human Resources Company.[13]

In 2004, TRADOC published the *Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity*,

which explained in detail the reasoning behind Army transformation and how the

transformed units would be structured and employed. A brief synopsis in chapter 1 cited

the fact that the Army's post-Cold-War organizations were not flexible and responsive

enough to meet the requirements of the joint force commander. "They met JFCs' needs,

but at high costs in organizational turbulence, inefficiency, and slower response times

than desired."[14] One passage referred to the challenges associated with the practice of

utilizing Army Reserve and National Guard unit to fill capability gaps that existed in the

active component:

> Moreover, because the Active Army's base of support troops did not contain
> sufficient specialized troops, the Army often had to activate Army Reserve and
> National Guard units to support deploying ad hoc task forces. These challenges,
> combined with a completely changed strategic and operational environment,
> spurred the Army to undertake the most comprehensive redesign of its field forces
> since the World War Two.[15]

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[13]CPT Shaunarey Amos, "Establishing Modular Human Resources Operations in
Iraq," *Army Logistician* (January-February 2009): 23-25.

[14]Headquarters, TRADOC, *Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity* (Fort
Monroe, VA: Government Printing Office, 8 October 2004), 1-5.

[15]Ibid.

Part of the reason the Army adopted the BCT approach that we have today was to get away from deploying ad hoc organizations, which seems incongruent with what is happening in EAB sustainment units. The *Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity* recognizes this incongruity by stating:

> Unlike BCTs but like UExs, support brigades will not be fixed organizations. Support brigades are designed around a base of organic elements, to which a mix of additional capabilities is added, based on the campaign or major operation. To make the brigades both tailorable and effective, the brigade headquarters includes the necessary expertise to control many different capabilities. Each brigade base also includes organic signal and sustainment capabilities.[16]

The link between modularity and transformation is made very succinctly in a paper written by COL Katherine Cook while she attended the National War College. The paper, titled *"Transforming The Force and Logistics Transformation,"* provides a chronology of logistics transformation from Desert Storm to the present. In this chronology, COL Cook notes that prior to current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the primary goal of logistics transformation was to become more agile and responsive, "to reduce the tooth to tail ratio." However, with the lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom, the focus changed to integrating new or enhanced capabilities into the force. In order to accomplish this, it was envisioned that new modular force structures would be required. It was due to these conclusions that the theater sustainment commands (TSC), expeditionary sustainment commands (ESC), and sustainment brigades were created. Although this manuscript was written rather early in the logistics transformation timeline (2006), COL Cook was clearly anticipating potential issues with leader development in EAB logistics units, when she wrote:

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[16]Ibid., 1-16.

It is unclear how ARFORGEN will work for the CSS community. CSS Soldiers and the Army have benefited from Soldier assignments within the band of logistics units operating at the last tactical mile with the BCT, to working at levels above Divisions. As we create more multifunctional support elements and move away from functional support, it behooves CSS leaders to encourage and train CSS Soldiers to gain more multi-functional support experience whenever possible. CSS Soldiers serving at different levels of support gain a better understanding of how the Army and its support system operate and can improve, and create better leaders.[17]

COL Cook identified a second issue in this logistics transformation plan by noting the lack of lethality in Combat Service Support (CSS) units despite the fact that current conflicts present a non-contiguous battlefield making CSS units amongst the most vulnerable. She went on to make the recommendation for better equipping these units to meet these challenges and called for additional training as well. While the need to better train and resource these units is clear, COL Cook's manuscript failed to anticipate the inherent difficulties today's highly modular (and often geographically dispersed) forces would present in any attempt to implement these recommendations.

Following the last round of transformation, the Army published Field Manual Intermediate 4-93.2 *The Sustainment Brigade* which displays the modular nature and missions of the sustainment brigades and their subordinate units:

Combat Sustainment Support Battalions (CSSB) are the building blocks of the sustainment brigades. Their designs are standardized and can consist of up to eight companies. CSSBs are modular and task organized to support TO [Theater Opening], TD [Theater Distribution], area sustainment, or life support missions.[18]

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[17]COL Katherine M. Cook, "Transforming the Force and Logistics Transformation" (Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2006), 6.

[18]Department of the Army, Field Manual Interim (FMI) 4-93.2, *The Sustainment Brigade* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 1-4.

> **Research Idea:** In each of the sustainment brigade's missions, certain capabilities will be required. Could these capabilities primarily demarcated at the company level be made organic to the CSSBs, a number of which would be made organic to the sustainment brigade?

Figure 9.   Research Idea 4

Source: Created by author.

At the 2008 Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Logistics Symposium, there was a briefing given titled "Logistics Modularity, Do We Have It Right." In this briefing, several sustainment brigade commanders with recent deployed experience shared their lessons learned. Although most of the feedback indicated a marked improvement in the capabilities offered by the new organizational structure, the 82nd Sustainment Brigade emphasized the importance of habitual relationships, "We are negating the importance of cohesive relationships with subordinate units and supported HQs. At a minimum we need to improve battalion and below habitual relationships."[19]

A RAND Corporation study entitled "Dimensions of Army Transformation" suggests that the drive toward transformation actually began with GEN Sullivan in 1993 with a focus on net-centric warfare. It concludes that this continued with GEN Shinseki with the push for lighter vehicles and finally with GEN Schoomaker with the change to a brigade centric force in more or less a natural progression based on political, budgetary, and strategic changes. The article also concluded that the last round of transformation did much to stabilize the force, and that the level of "unit turbulence" would not be

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[19]U.S. Department of the Army, "Logistics Modularity, Do We Have It Right" (2008 AUSA Logistics Symposium, Washington, DC, 14 May 2008).

happening if we did not choose to invade Iraq. "Unit stabilization could solve turbulence problems. This probably wouldn't have happened if we had just done Afghanistan."[20]

In a report for the Congressional Budget Office regarding the Army's modular redesign, two topics relevant to this study were discussed. First, the lack of equipment for training was reported as a potential detriment to training with the Congressional Budget Office looking into the cost to remedy this shortfall. The second topic was the Army initiative to bring stability to the force by keeping soldiers and leaders in units longer in order to "foster unit cohesion and operational effectiveness."[21] It was also envisioned that this would enhance unit training and leaders development.

In an oral history interview MAJ Lowell Howard, former Executive Officer of the STB, 1st Sustainment Brigade, had several observations related to the modular structure of the sustainment brigade and the resulting organizational turbulence:

> I have always found that the Soldiers are very resilient, very mission focused and always get the job done. That being said, is the way we are doing things the most efficient, effective way? No, more controls need to be emplaced on modularity. In the current environment, you will not see the same level of commitment that you would see in a unit that had been together for a long time. This takes time to develop, so you cannot expect some unit from a different installation to instantly buy in to the battalion's way of doing things, what you get is compliance instead of commitment.[22]

MAJ Howard went on to note that even battalion level leadership would have difficulty with "buy in" with a higher HQ due to the transient nature of sustainment units,

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[20]Thomas McNaugher, "Dimensions of Army Transformation," RAND Corporation, Wednesday Seminar Series, Spring 2006.

[21]Andrew Feickert, Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, CRS Report for Congress, *U.S. Army's Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2006).

[22]Howard, Oral history interview.

stating, "I noticed this myself, as I saw multiple different Commanding Generals, come through our HQ. After awhile, you feel like a hired hand, like a contractor, which would make the subordinate companies sub contractors."[23] When discussing the long term impact of the high level of organizational turbulence, MAJ Howard observed a good number of officers were getting out of the Army. While these decisions cannot be attributed to modularity or organizational turbulence, there may be a relationship.

<div align="center">Studies Related to ARFORGEN and the Sourcing Process</div>

In chapter 1, a general overview of the ARFORGEN and sourcing processes was presented. In this section the current literature on ARFORGEN and the sourcing process in application is the focus. ARFORGEN is the process is used to manage the force and ensure the ability to support demands for Army forces. The need for this new management system arose from the army's decision to move to the brigade-centric force.

In an article for *Army Sustainment*, MAJ Charlie Ward, Executive Officer of the STB, 3rd Sustainment Brigade, noted the level of complexity experienced by the 3rd Sustainment Brigade in its management of ARFORGEN. MAJ Ward cited the fact that the 3rd Sustainment Brigade had a total 33 deployable UICs all with different deployment timelines, "Having such a large number of UICs that are deployed and redeployed in a non-homogenous manner creates many challenges for the sustainment brigade and CSSB headquarters."[24] MAJ Ward goes on to discuss the difficulties that relatively small units face when going through the reset phase of ARFORGEN. In an

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[23]Ibid.

[24]Charlie Ward, "Managing ARFORGEN Operations in a Modular Sustainment Brigade," *Army Sustainment* (January-February 2010): 2-4.

attempt to alleviate much of this issue, the 3rd Sustainment Brigade adopted the practice

of "bundling" units in reset phase by quarter in order to maximize the utilization of reset

assets. In this article, issues during the train/ready phase were discussed, with the author

contrasting the process for coordinating a culmination training event for a BCT versus the

individual units of the sustainment brigade. He cited the fact that a BCT commander can

validate the training of his entire brigade in a single culmination training event versus the

sustainment brigade's need for coordinating a culmination training event for an element

as small as a team. MAJ Ward outlined how the recently initiated separate sourcing

conference for EAB sustainment units could be a partial solution to this problem. This

new conference, which is chaired by the FORSCOM G3 and G4, would offer a venue for

TSC, ESC, and sustainment brigade commanders to have input into the sourcing of EFPs.

This will allow FORSCOM to better align units' deployments with their home station

chain of command and reduce the overall level of organizational turbulence.

Research Idea: Would adding the geographical location of a unit into the sourcing decision process allow the Army to better capitalize on habitual relationships in CSS units at EAB?

Figure 10.   Research Idea 5

Source: Created by author.

MAJ Ward was not alone in his observation of issues during the train/ready phase

of ARFOGEN. MAJ Howard also noted that during the train/ready phase, the unit did not

receive some replacements until 3 months prior to deployment, and that after the

deployment, almost half of the soldiers waived the stabilization offered as part of reset in

order to go to the next assignment. MAJ Howard attributed this to the fact that many

knew they were going to have a Permanent Change of Station anyway. He offered as a

second factor that they probably did not develop the same affinity for the unit that you

would expect to see in a BCT and gave this example:

> If you were to be assigned to the 3rd ACR, you would expect to deploy with the
> 3rd ACR. When your future is more ambiguous such as a Soldier going to a
> company in the sustainment brigade you wouldn't necessarily get the buy in or
> the level of commitment. In many respects, a soldier will probably associate with
> the highest level that they experienced as a whole, which in many cases is the
> company. This is where the loyalties will be, to the company.[25]

MAJ Howard felt that a major issue was the lack of continuity, particularly in

garrison. He outlined the example of the 541st CSSB which deployed to Iraq and

transferred to the STB several companies who were not scheduled to deploy. In less than

3 or 4 months the 24th Transportation Company deployed to Iraq but did not end up

working for the 541st while in theater since the 541st had inherited a transportation

company. As a result, this company commander had 3 battalion commanders in a

calendar year. MAJ Howard felt that this was a lost opportunity to capitalize on habitual

relationships stating: "This did not seem to make a lot of sense. Relationships take time to

build, why then would we not have capitalized on an opportunity for a unit to deploy with

its garrison higher headquarters with which it has a habitual relationship. That situation

made no sense."[26]

On 7 October 2009, FORSCOM conducted an ARFORGEN rockdrill (rehearsal)

that outlined several shortfalls in resourcing units as they go through the ARFORGEN

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[25]Howard, Oral history interview.

[26]Ibid.

process. In the accompanying slide show presentation, "Improving ARFORGEN: Gaining a Common Framework for RESET U.S. Army Forces Command's ILW Panel," the conclusion reached was that personnel and equipment sourcing were out of synch and creating equipment shortfalls that had a negative effect on training. In order to combat this, it was concluded that a systematic approach was required. As a result, TRADOC intends to institutionalize and synchronize the training support packages necessary for pre-deployment training. This plan should do very well in providing these resources for deploying BCTs, but does not address individual companies, particularly ones that are geographically separated from the unit that they will be deploying with. In order to get the benefit of the TRADOC plan, these companies will have to either rely on TDY travel, piggy-backing on training conducted by a third party, or coordinate for their own training knowing full well that they will fall behind the BCTs in prioritization.

In an *Army Logistician* article, LTC Beougher and SFC Haynes, who served as the Force Generation officer in charge and non-commissioned officer in charge for the 3rd Corps Support Command, give an overview of the sourcing process in support of ARFORGEN as it relates to logistics units at EAB. In one passage, they outline some of the factors that go into determining which units will be utilized to fill a validated requirement "The FORSCOM experts for each branch, called organizational integrators, work to match requirements with available units. The organizational integrators take a wide variety of factors into account, focusing on deployment versus dwell time, the unit's suitability for the URF mission, and requested capabilities."[27] The article goes on to

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[27]Lieutenant Colonel David Beougher and Sergeant First Class Bruce A. Haynes, "Logistics Force Generation for Iraq," *Army Logistician* (March-April 2008): 14-16.

explain how some requirements (such as heavy equipment transport) exceed the available pool of unit which are then filled with in lieu of units.

This section reviewed articles related to ARFORGEN and the sourcing processes. From these articles, it is clear that a cyclical readiness process is needed to support combatant commander requirements; and that ARFORGEN and sourcing processes do present challenges. These articles presented challenges encountered during the train/ready phase which directly impacted organizational development and unit training.

Studies Related to Leader and Organizational Development

A leader development study conducted by the Department of the Army in June of 2000 found several shortfalls that still exist today. The study cited of training resources which are having a direct impact on the quality of home station training. It is these training opportunities that are vital to the development of junior officers and NCOs. The study also observed that the excessive operational pace is causing a degraded quality of training and leader development. This degradation in training was cited as having a detrimental effect on unit readiness, and morale.

Army Regulation 600-100 defines leadership as:

Leader development is the deliberate, continuous, sequential, and progressive process, grounded in Army values that grows Soldiers and civilians into competent and confident leaders capable of decisive action. Leader development is achieved through lifelong synthesis of the knowledge, skills, and experiences gained through institutional training and education, organizational training, operational experience, and self-development. Commanders and other organizational leaders play the key role in leader development that ideally produces competent, confident, and agile leaders who act with boldness and initiative in dynamic and complex situations."[28]

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[28]Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 600-100, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 8.

In the units of the sustainment brigade this process is often not continuous, which has a stunting effect on junior leader development. Army Regulation 600-100 goes on to state: "All leaders have a responsibility to develop those junior to them to the fullest extent possible. In addition to institutional training and education, leaders can facilitate development through the knowledge and feedback they provide through counseling, coaching, and mentoring."[29] With the frequent changes in task organization, company grade officers and NCOs in the sustainment brigades do not receive consistent teaching coaching or mentorship. This is not a case where senior officers and NCOs are not making an effort; the problem is simply lack of continuity.

A Federal News Radio article discussed the impact of having the fourth different administrator in charge of the General Services Administration over the last two years. This article surmised that the underperformance of this agency could be directly tied to the organizational instability caused by the frequent changes in leadership which apparently led to a lack of confidence in the organization on the part of the employees. This article goes on to explain that a lack of confidence was due to a lack of a long term vision which would be there with a long time administrator but is lacking with an "acting" administrator. "An acting administrator can be effective, but when it comes to a congressional hearing or dealing with industry on a contentious issue such as procurement, they want to deal with someone who will be there for some time and can make decisions stick," the author stated: "An acting (leader) can do that but not to the same extent as a permanent administrator can."[30] If having four different administrators

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[29]Ibid., 1-9.

[30]Jason Miller, "Agency Instability: GSA Begins to Feel Toll of not Having

over the last two years is cited as a cause of a drop in performance in a government agency, would having three or more different battalion commanders over the course of a 15 to 18 month company command tour have a similar result?

In an article investigating the impact of housing instability on the cognitive development of children it was discovered that the "results indicate that whether a child is currently homeless is not as significant as overall stability which may have a long ranging effect on a child's future development."[31] While this article dealt with the development of children versus adults, it provides insights into the development process, therefore, the impact of instability on leader development surely deserves additional attention.

FM 6-22 recommends that leader and organizational development needs to have a long term approach, stating that "a leader must have a vision that spans the next quarter, the next year, and the next 5 years."[32] In discussion of the team building, FM 6-22 refers to training over time building a collective confidence and a sense of belonging critical to organizational development.

The Army publishes annual performance improvement criteria in an effort to improve organizational development. In the 2007 Army Performance Improvement Criteria, consistency and predictability were stressed as essential to the development of

Permanent Leader," Federal News Radio, 14 January 2010, http://federalnewsradio.com/?nid=288&sid=1862573 (accessed 9 May 2010).

[31]Catherine Schmidtz, Janet Wagner, and Edna Menke, "Homelessness as One Component of Housing Instability and its Impact on the Development of Children in Poverty," http://homelessness.samhsa.gov/Resource/View.aspx?id=47661&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (accessed 9 May 2010).

[32]Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 11-4.

effective organizations. The 2007 Army Performance Improvement Criteria underscores how difficult it is to achieve consistency and predictability in the current environment, "Regardless of the institutional leader turbulence in the Army, the goal must be to develop leaders who have an intrinsic motivation to build organizations for the long term, even if extrinsic factors dictate otherwise"[33]

Studies Related to Unit Training

In an article written by LTC Karl Reed titled "21st Century Home Station Model Supporting ARFORGEN at the Mountain Post," the author makes the point that under the ARFORGEN model units will have a greater reliance on home station training in preparation for deployment. To further this point, he details a training exercise called "Bayonet Strike" which was built in support of the 2nd BCT of the 2nd Infantry Division and was by all accounts a resounding success. In an article written by LTC Jeffrey Doll in which the author gives observations of the performance of CSSBs at the Joint Readiness Training Center, LTC Doll makes the point that due to the modular nature of CSSBs they have a greater necessity for pre-deployment planning. The author notes that failure to do so creates friction between the CSSB staff and the subordinate companies. While the author stops short of saying it, this would seem to be a call to place a greater emphasis on habitual relationships.

FM 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, discusses tailored force packages which are comprised of units from multiple commands and instillations and the

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[33]Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, Vice Director of the Army Staff, Strategic Management and Innovations Branch, *2007 Army Performance Improvement Criteria* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007).

importance of coordination between the Administrative Control commander and the Force Package commander with respect to training. FM 7-0 goes on to state that modular formations require a higher degree of training and operational synchronization. If it is the assumption that greater synchronization is required at the BCT level, it seems as though relying on company level organizations to ensure this synchronization is assuming too much risk. FM 7-0 addresses importance in standardizing home station training requirements, noting that if these responsibilities become dynamic versus static, command and control turbulence is the result.

<div align="center">Conclusion</div>

In this chapter, literature and oral history interviews relevant to the factors contributing to organizational turbulence were examined. From this examination a couple of themes have become evident. First, modularity has provided the flexibility to tailor EFPs with the required capabilities to best meet the combatant commander's requirements. Second, the levels of organizational turbulence due in part to the level of modularity have presented the companies of the sustainment brigades with unique challenges which deserve further study. This chapter also examined literature related to leader and organizational development as well as unit training. There is general agreement that modular organizations require increased coordination and planning particularly with regards to pre-deployment training. The literature also suggests that a high degree of consistency and predictability is important for leader and organizational development as well as unit training. From the literature, it is clear the current level of organizational turbulence within sustainment brigades is not producing such conditions.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter describes the process which will be used to address the

organizational turbulence experienced by the company level units of the sustainment

brigades which have resulted in a less than optimal environment for unit training, leader

development and organizational development. This methodology explains the approach

to the literature and oral history interviews considered in the previous chapter and

establish a framework for analyzing the information discovered. It provides a

methodology for analyzing the courses of action presented to potentially correct or at the

very least limit the impact that organizational turbulence resulting from frequent changes

in task organization has had on company level units of the sustainment brigades. The

previous chapter explored literature and oral history interviews that addressed the

primary factors contributing to organizational turbulence (modularity, ARFORGEN, and

the sourcing process), a secondary factor (transformation), as well as the areas affected

by organizational turbulence (unit training, leader development and organizational

development) in order to clearly identify the problem.

The method used to examine the research question is a variation of the seven step

problem-solving model used by the U.S. Army and the organization of this chapter is

patterned after a study by MAJ Bryan Betty, "Recommendations for Army Force

Generation Synchronization of The National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force

Package"[34]. This method provides a structure to develop, analyze, and compare solutions

in a systematic fashion. This chapter identifies the methodology chosen to address the

research question, explains the research plan, and provides a clear path to examining

solutions in the next chapter.

Figure 11.   The Seven Step Problem-Solving Model
Source: Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 5-0, *Army Planning and Order Production* (Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 2005), 2-6.

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[34]MAJ Bryan Betty, "Recommendations For Army Force Generation Synchronization of The National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package" (Thesis, Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 December 2009), 43-57.

<u>The Army Seven Step Problem-Solving Model</u>

The methodology used in this analysis takes the seven steps shown in figure 6 to make recommendations for possible solutions in the final step of the model.

<u>Step 1: Identify the Problem</u>

The problem this thesis addresses is the frequent changes in task organization experienced by the company level units of the sustainment brigades resulting in organizational turbulence which presents a less than optimal environment for unit training, leader development and organizational development. This study investigates options which reduce the level of organizational turbulence experienced by the companies of the sustainment brigade and enhance unit training, leader development, and organizational development.

This problem type readily lends itself to a qualitative rather than quantitative analysis. One issue with this is that there is little data directly examining the issue of organizational turbulence resulting from frequent task organization changes or the long term impact on leader development, organizational development and unit training. As a result, the qualitative analysis conducted examines how and why the problem occurred from a purely hypothetical standpoint. In the course of this study, several solutions will be examined that impact either the current task organization of units within the sustainment brigade, the unit structure of select units, involve changes to the sourcing process or involve the creation of a new battalion structure, with the goal of improving leader development, unit training, and organizational development. Due to the fact that this is a qualitative study, it is likely that there will not be a single answer to this problem

and will likely require some modification. FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders*

Production, defines problems such as this as a medium-structured problem:

> Medium-structured problems represent the preponderance of the problems Army leaders face. These types of problems fall between the two extremes of well- and ill-structured problems. In these medium-structured problems, problem solvers may find that:
>
> -some information is available
>
> -the problems may be partially defined
>
> -such problems may or may not lend themselves to routine solutions
>
> -the problems require some creative skills to solve
>
> -the problems normally involve making assumptions about future conditions or impacting current actions on the future.[35]

The research conducted reviewed literature and oral history interviews that

addressed the primary factors (modularity, ARFORGEN, the sourcing process), a

secondary factor (transformation) and the areas being affected (organizational

development, leader development and unit training). Chapter 1 outlined the scope and

limitations of this study and defined the primary and secondary factors, while offering

some basic assumptions in the analysis process. With the problem identified, information

gathering could begin.

<u>Thesis Questions</u>

The goal of this thesis is to analyze the impact that organizational turbulence

resulting from frequent changes in task organization has had on the company level units

of the sustainment brigades focusing on unit training, leader development, and

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[35]Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 2-5.

organizational development. In the course of the study potential solutions that reduce the level of organizational turbulence experienced by the companies of the sustainment brigade and enhance unit training, leader development, and organizational development will be examined.

Proposed Research Question: How are modularity, the ARFORGEN process, and the Army sourcing process contributing to organizational turbulence in company sized units within sustainment brigades?

Sub Question: How is this organizational turbulence affecting unit training, leader development and organizational development in these units?

Second Sub Question: Could modifications in modularity and such measures as permanently assigning some units to battalion level HQ lessen the impacts of modularity while still meeting the requirements of the Combatant Commander?

Step 2: Gather Information

This step is the research phase for the thesis. Gathering information relevant to the problem required a research plan to focus the effort. A relatively small number of documents look at the organizational turbulence faced by the companies of the sustainment brigade and the potential impact on leader development, organizational development, and unit training. In addition to these documents, two oral history interviews were conducted with officers who served in sustainment brigades and had observed the effects organizational turbulence had on leader development, organizational development, and leader training.

After viewing the available texts, the information was grouped into four areas; modularity/transformation, ARFORGEN/the sourcing process, leader/organizational, and

unit training. This examination confirmed many of the assumptions that were made going into the study and brought to light several potential solutions to this problem which will be examined in detail in the next chapter.

<center>Step 3: Develop Criteria</center>

In the course of the research, several potential solutions became evident, necessitating a methodology to screen, compare, and evaluate each as a separate course of action (COA). In order to evaluate each COA, it is required to establish evaluation criteria, which will allow for the comparison of each potential solution, ultimately leading to a recommendation. It is important that these criteria are developed prior to generating potential COAs in order to ensure that favoritism is not shown to one COA over another.

<center>Screening Criteria</center>

The approach used in this thesis will be the screening process commonly used in the seven step problem solving process. This screening process will utilize the given criteria to ensure potential solutions can solve the problem. It is possible given the solutions offered that a combination of options will yield the best outcome versus a single solution. That being the case, each solution will first be screened independently and possibly combined with other solutions in an attempt to best answer the thesis questions.

In analyzing each COA, the screening criteria will utilize the COA characteristics outlined in Joint Publication 5-0. Viable solutions will be ones that meet the criteria Adequate, Feasible, Acceptable, Distinguishable, and Complete:

1. Adequate: Solves the problem while maintaining the ability to accomplish the mission within the commander's guidance.

<center>41</center>

2. Feasible: fits within available resources.

3. Acceptability: worth the cost or risk.

4. Distinguishable: differs significantly from other solutions.

5. Complete: contains the critical aspects of solving the problem from start to finish.[36]

<center>Evaluation Criteria</center>

After completing the literature review, several potential solutions became evident. In order to properly investigate each potential solution, it is necessary to develop evaluation criteria which will form the rubric for comparison. In the course of the research, four factors stood out as possible evaluation criteria: the need to maintain the flexibility to meet the requirements of the combatant commander, the need to reduce the level of organizational turbulence, the need to reduce cost associated with training, and the need for balance between reduction in organizational turbulence and flexibility. From these factors, four applicable evaluation criteria: cost, flexibility, stability, and effectiveness were selected.

The evaluation criteria of cost will be a measure of the resulting changes in cost required to train the force, primarily TDY costs associated with any pre-deployment exercises. The next element in selecting a solution is flexibility, which will measure the impact a given solution has on the ability to tailor a logistics package in support of the combatant commander's requirements. The third element in selecting a solution is stability, which will evaluate the impact a given solution has on unit stability. The final

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[36]Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), III-28.

element selected as an evaluation criterion, effectiveness, measures how well a solution

solves the problem. This standard measures the relative level of completeness which each

potential solution lowers the level of organizational turbulence while retaining the

flexibility to support the combatant commander's requirements.

The tool used to characterize and define each criterion is a rubric. A rubric defines

each evaluation criterion and establishes a benchmark to measure each COA. The benefit

of a rubric methodology is the ability to paint a word picture that defines each criterion

and clearly states that benchmark to measure a COA against the criteria. A simple three-

tiered measure defines these logical benchmarks: Optimal, Desirable, and Less Than

Desirable.[37]

Cost

Table 1 describes the evaluation criterion cost.

Table 1.   Evaluation Criterion: Cost

Evaluation Criterion: Cost
Cost: How much will the COA cost? What is the impact on cost related to training and travel expenses? Inexpensive solutions are best.
Less Than Desirable: The COA requires the commitment of substantial, yet still acceptable, resources.
Desirable: The COA requires little or no change in commitment of additional resources.
Optimal: The COA reduces capital expenditures or results in an overall cost savings.

Source: Created by author, derived from MAJ Bryan Betty, "Recommendations For Army Force Generation Synchronization of The National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package" (Thesis, Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 December 2009), 51.

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[37]Jack D. Kem, *Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade.* 3rd ed. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2009), 105-107.

Flexibility

Table 2 describes the evaluation criterion Flexibility.

Table 2.   Evaluation Criterion: Flexibility

Evaluation Criterion: Flexibility
Flexibility: Flexibility is a measure of the ability to tailor a logistics package to meet a mission requirement. A Flexible solution meets the combatant commander's requirements without deploying unneeded capabilities.
Less Than Desirable: The COA requires the deployment of capabilities not required for the mission, or limits the commander's ability to task organize resources as necessary.
Desirable: Implementation of the COA does not require unneeded capabilities to be deployed but may limit the commander's ability to task organize resources as necessary.
Optimal: Implementation of the COA does not require unneeded capabilities to be deployed and does not limit the commander's ability to task organize resources as necessary.

Source: Created by author.

Stability

Table 3 describes the evaluation criterion stability.

Table 3.   Evaluation Criterion: Stability

Evaluation Criterion: Stability
Stability: Does this COA provide a greater degree of stability to the leaders and Soldiers? Stability is a measure of whether or not the solution decreases the level of organizational turbulence, thereby creating continuity. Organizational turbulence will be measured by the number of units that are in different ARFORGEN cycles in a given sustainment brigade. The lower the number of units in different ARFORGEN cycles the more continuity between units, leaders, and Soldiers. Solutions that offer more stability are better.
Less Than Desirable: The COA offers little or no change in the high level of organizational turbulence. Solutions in this tier are feasible, suitable, and complete but do not generate the desired level of stability.
Desirable: The solution lowers organizational turbulence by less than 50%.
Optimal: The solution lowers organizational turbulence by more than 50%.

Source: Created by author.

Effectiveness

Table 4 describes the evaluation criterion effectiveness.

Table 4.   Evaluation Criterion: Effectiveness

Evaluation Criterion: Effectiveness
Effectiveness: How well does the COA solve the problem? Effectiveness is a measure of how completely the solution addresses the pertinent issues of the thesis. Comprehensive solutions reduce the level of organizational turbulence while retaining the required flexibility to meet the demands of the combatant commander. Solutions that are more effective are better.
Less Than Desirable: The COA generates the desired end state, but only partially addresses the primary problem without consideration of secondary issues or effects. Solutions in this tier are feasible, suitable, and complete but are singular in focus without comprehensive effects.
Desirable: The solution generates the desired end state, fully addressing the primary issue and makes provisions for, but does not necessarily resolve secondary issues. The solution successfully resolves the problem.
Optimal: The COA holistically addresses the problem and resolves many if not all secondary issues.

Source: Created by author, derived from MAJ Bryan Betty, "Recommendations For Army Force Generation Synchronization of The National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package" (Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2009), 53.

Step 4: Generate Possible Options

The research conducted in chapter 2 generated a number of possible solutions for consideration. In chapter 4 these options will be examined in detail. For each option, the facts and assumptions that are required for analysis will be listed. This will be done in the interest of thoroughness and enhance the assessment of a given COA.

Examination of each COA will be conducted first individually and possibly in conjunction with one or several COAs in order to achieve the best solution possible.

<u>Step 5: Analyze Possible Solutions</u>

Continuing application of the U.S. Army's doctrinal problem-solving method, potential solutions will be screened or modified allowing examination of only the best possible solutions and subsequent comparison with other solutions to determine the best possible COAs.

After screening, each COA will be evaluated against the established evaluation criteria independent of one another, being careful not to compare one COA with another. By assessing in this manner, each solution's merits and drawbacks will become evident.

<u>Step 6: Compare Possible Solutions</u>

The final step before selecting a solution is a comparison of each COA's strengths and weaknesses. Similar to a decision matrix, the model used for this thesis consists of a COA comparison chart using evaluation criteria. This chart depicts a comparison of each COA against the evaluation criteria and assists identification of the benefits and drawbacks of the COA. Table 5 summarizes the evaluation criteria. Table 6 is an example COA comparison chart for recording the results of this comparison.

Table 5.   Evaluation Criteria Summary

Evaluation Criteria	Less Than Desirable	Desirable	Optimal
Cost	Costs more than the current system	Costs the same as the current system	Costs less than the current system
Flexibility	Greatly limits flexibility	Moderate effect on flexibility	Little or no effect on flexibility
Effectiveness	Resolves single aspect of the problem	Resolves some or most aspects of the problem	Resolves all aspects of the problem
Stability	Offers little or no change to level of organizational turbulence	Offers less than 50% decrease in organizational turbulence	Offers less than 50% decrease in organizational turbulence.

Source: Created by author, derived from MAJ Bryan Betty, "Recommendations For Army Force Generation Synchronization of The National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package" (Thesis, Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 December 2009), 55.

Table 6.   Example Course of Action Comparison Table

Evaluation Criteria	COA 1	COA 2	COA 3
Cost			
Flexibility			
Effectiveness			
Stability			

Source: Created by author, derived from MAJ Bryan Betty, "Recommendations For Army Force Generation Synchronization of The National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package" (Thesis, Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 December 2009), 55.

<u>Step 7: Make and Implement the Decision</u>

Although the title of Step 7 indicates a decision and implementation, this thesis uses chapter 5 to rank order and propose recommended solutions within the previously defined limitations of the thesis.

Conclusion

This chapter identified and explained the process used to solve the question posed. The thesis will follow a variation of the seven step problem-solving model used by the U.S. Army and benchmark rubric development from Kem's *Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade.* This chapter identified the methodology used, the problem type, and how this methodology applies to the research question, setting the stage for chapter 4 (analysis).

The next chapter will begin with Step 4 of the problem-solving model (Generate Possible Options). As each potential solution is screened and evaluated, any solutions deemed unfeasible will be eliminated or modified prior to further consideration. At the conclusion of chapter 4, a recommended COA will be decided on and detailed in chapter 5 along with a recommendation for further study if the research warrants it.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

<u>Introduction</u>

The fourth chapter is Analysis. For this study, the analysis in this chapter will

cover steps four through six of the Army Seven Step Problem-Solving model in FM 5-0,

Army Plans and Orders Production. The previous chapter outlined the methodology of

the study, including the first three steps of the model. The development and definition of

both the screening and evaluation criteria used in chapter 3 provide the foundation for the

analysis in this chapter.

The research conducted in chapter 2 led to the development of six courses of

action. Each COA will be presented in full detail along with the facts and assumptions

needed to continue the analysis. Each COA will be screened through individual

application of the criteria of adequate, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete.

In order to evaluate each COA, a rubric utilizing four evaluation criteria will be utilized

(cost, flexibility, stability, and effectiveness), which will allow the analysis on the basis

of advantages and disadvantages.

<u>Step 4: Generate Options</u>

Potential solutions to the problem became evident during the conduct of research

and a total of six COAs have been identified. The six COAs are: COA 1: maintain the

status quo; COA 2: make geography part of the ARFORGEN sourcing decision; COA 3:

assign human resources and financial management companies to the STB and all others

to the CSSBs; COA 4: limit modularity to the battalion level; COA 5: develop a

permanent home station structure for field service companies; COA 6: assign casualty assistance teams to division/corps/ESC/TSC G1 shops. The screening for all six initial COAs will be covered in detail later in the chapter, but an initial look reveals that, only COA 1, 2 and 3 meet all of the screening criteria. COA 4 is not distinguishable from COA 3 and will be discarded. COA 5 is not feasible without additional resources but will be examined further under the assumption that future Army transformation efforts could potentially make these resources available. COA 6 is not complete across the whole of the problem, but it does solve the problem as it relates to Human Resources Companies, and will be forwarded as an addition to COA 3.

Following The initial screening process we are left with 4 COAs which will be developed, with COA 3 being a hybrid option incorporating COA6.

<div align="center">Course of Action Development</div>

<div align="center">Courses of Action</div>

With a basic understanding of the origins of each potential solution, the next step is to fully define the COA and identify those facts and assumptions necessary to the analysis.

Course of Action 1: The Status Quo

Restated summary: The current or "status quo" option would continue the practice of companies and in some cases platoons or squads having a separate deployable UIC. While this practice would retain the highest level of flexibility, it also has the highest level of organizational turbulence which does not represent the optimal situation for leader development, organizational development or unit training.

Facts

      1. This COA offers a maximum level of modularity and therefore a maximum level of flexibility.

      2. This COA results in a high level of organizational turbulence.

Assumptions

      1. The high level of organizational turbulence would retard leadership and organizational development.

      2. Integration of the EFP would take longer due to variations in terminology with units from different backgrounds such as heavy, light or airborne, as well as a lack of standard operating procedures that may be present in units having a habitual relationship.

      3. Organizational turbulence could have an effect on training and training management which would erode unit readiness.

      4. In order to overcome training and integration shortfalls, it would require significant TDY costs to bring the EFP together for a mission rehearsal exercise. This would also require Soldiers to spend additional time away from home which may cause an additional set of issues.

      5. This option should have a very low transportation cost associated with deployment into theater due to the fact that a tailored package would not have any unneeded capabilities which would needlessly tie up transportation assets.

Restated Summary

Currently, geography is not a consideration in the sourcing decision cycle. The primary drivers are the required capability and the dwell time. By adding geography into the decision cycle, the plan would call for units that possess the required capability and in the available phase at the time of deployment be selected. The unit would be selected based upon geography first and by dwell time second, if a unit of the proper type is not available on the same post as the battalion HQ. By doing so, there would be an increased preservation of habitual relationships, reduced TDY costs, and a reduction of organizational turbulence.

Facts

1. For this COA to have an impact, the consideration of geography would have to take precedence over dwell time provided that all units under consideration were in the available phase at the time of deployment.

2. This would increase the incidence of units (company and below) being selected from the same sustainment brigade if not the same CSSB reducing the organizational turbulence.

3. By being from the same installation as the parent CSSB (or STB), there would be less requirement for TDY travel and additional time away from families.

4. Would maintain a maximum level of flexibility.

Assumptions

      1. A decrease in organizational turbulence should provide a better environment for leader and organizational development.

      2. Increased preservation of habitual relationships should result in a decrease in the time required for integration of the EFP.

      3. This option should have a very low transportation cost associated with deployment into theater due to the fact that a tailored package would not have any unneeded capabilities which would needlessly tie up transportation assets.

      4. Could result in a decrease in dwell time, particularly in the first few cycles following implementation, but dwell time would not violate the Chief of Staff's directive for minimum dwell time allowed. The decrease in dwell would be due to the fact that a unit at the desired installation would be selected over a unit that simply had more dwell time as long as each unit had the required 12 months at home.

Course of Action 3: Permanent Attachment of Companies
to Either the STB or CSSB

Restated Summary

      Under COA 3, the human resources, financial management and field services companies would be permanently assigned to the STB, while the transportation, QM and field maintenance companies would be permanently assigned to the CSSBs. In addition, the casualty assistance teams currently resident in the HR Company would be permanently assigned to the Division, Corps, ESC and TSC G1 sections that they deploy with. The remaining HR positions (platoon leader and platoon sergeant) would move to the sustainment brigade S1 section. This COA loses some flexibility due to reduced

modularity, but significantly reduces organizational turbulence. By restricting modularity to battalion sized elements, the conditions would be set to better foster leader development, organizational development, and unit training with the expected outcome being better trained and ready units. One drawback of this COA is that the potential exists for an unneeded capability to be deployed, tying up transportation assets that could be used better elsewhere. This negative aspect of this COA should be kept in perspective when looking at the potential scope of this issue and realize that it is relatively small, but bears mention.

Facts

1. This COA would significantly diminish the organizational turbulence currently being experienced by company sized elements in the sustainment brigades.

2. COA 3 involves moving a platoon sized element outside of the sustainment brigade as the casualty liaison teams are assigned to Division, Corps, ESC, and TSC G1 sections.

3. This COA maintains habitual relationships in battalion sized elements and below.

4. By being organic to a CSSB (or STB), there would be less requirement for TDY travel and additional time away from families.

5. Although there would be a loss of flexibility, this COA retains sufficient flexibility to meet combatant commander requirements.

Assumptions

     1. A decrease in organizational turbulence should provide a better environment for leader and organizational development.

     2. Increased preservation of habitual relationships should result in a decrease in the time required for integration of the EFP.

     3. By having a permanent battalion level HQ and staff, unit training and training management should improve.

     4. By being permanently assigned to a battalion, companies should be able to better develop an identity which should have a positive impact on esprit de corps.

Course of Action 4: Development of Home Station Battalion Structure

Restated Summary

     COA 4 would present a significant change to the sustainment brigade by assigning all companies to a newly created battalion structure which would have responsibility to train, organize, and resource units prior to deployment with one of the brigade's deployable HQ. While this would give the companies a permanent battalion staff to coordinate and manage training resources, it would do little to change the overall organizational turbulence. This COA would allow a high degree of flexibility, but would require an additional command team and staff for each sustainment brigade.

Facts

     1. Addresses many of the training resourcing and training management shortfalls that are currently being faced.

     2. Does not address the organizational turbulence caused by over modularity.

3. Retains the flexibility of the current system.

4. There would be a requirement for an additional battalion HQ in each sustainment brigade associated with this COA.

5. This is a relatively expensive COA in terms of additional personnel required.

6. Does not lessen the potential for TDY travel in connection with a pre-deployment training exercise.

Assumptions

1. Would potentially require additional facilities

2. This COA would retain a high level of organizational turbulence and would offer a minimal improvement in leadership and organizational development.

3. Integration of the EFP would take longer due to variations in terminology with units from different backgrounds such as heavy, light or airborne, as well as a lack of standard operating procedures that may be present in units having a habitual relationship.

4. This option should have a low transportation cost associated with deployment into theater due to the fact that a tailored package would not have any unneeded capabilities which would needlessly tie up transportation assets.

Step 5: Analyze Possible Solutions

The Analysis Phase consists of two discrete steps: COA screening and COA evaluation. Both steps rely on previously established criteria. The screening criteria used are directly from Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning.* The consistent threads discovered during research conducted in chapter 2 provided the basis for the evaluation criteria used in the analysis.

Course of Action Screening

In Step 4, Generate Options, a total of six COAs were screened initially and several were either eliminated or modified before four COAs were selected for further development. This step of the analysis ensures that only the best solutions move forward for comparison by eliminating untenable solutions utilizing the five screening criteria:

Screening Criteria

1. Adequate: Solves the problem while maintaining the ability to accomplish the mission within the commander's guidance.

2. Feasible: fits within available resources.

3. Acceptability: worth the cost or risk.

4. Distinguishable: differs significantly from other solutions.

5. Complete: contains the critical aspects of solving the problem from start to finish.[38]

Course of Action 1: The Status Quo

<u>Adequate</u>: The status quo does not address the problem.

<u>Feasible</u>: COA 1 is feasible as it is currently in effect.

<u>Acceptability</u>: It is debatable if the risk to leader development is worth the risk

<u>Distinguishable</u>: COA 1 is easily distinguishable from all other COAs.

<u>Complete</u>: This COA does not address the issue of potential leader development, organizational development or unit training issues that may be present as a result of excessive modularity.

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[38]Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, III-28.

Summary of screening results: Although COA 1 is neither adequate nor complete, this COA will be maintained as the benchmark to compare and contrast later in this chapter.

Course of Action 2: Geography as Part of Sourcing Decision

Adequate: COA 2 does not completely mitigate the effects of over modularity, but it does significantly improve the situation.

Feasible: COA 2 is feasible due to the fact that this COA will not require any additional resources.

Acceptability: It is likely that this COA will result in a slight decrease in dwell time in the first few cycles after implementation. This increase will not violate the Chief of Staff of the Army guidance and when paired with the potential improvements, is worth the risk.

Distinguishable: COA 2 is distinguishable from the other COAs.

Complete: COA 2 would offer a moderate decrease in organizational turbulence.

Summary of screening results: COA 2 meets the screening criteria required for further analysis. Analysis shows that COA 2 would present the potential for enhanced leader development through the preservation of habitual relationships.

Course of Action 3: Permanent Attachment of Companies
to Either the STB or CSSB

Adequate: COA 3 reduces the modularity of the force by making the battalion the lowest level modular structure. The results of this would be a decrease in organizational turbulence, setting the conditions for leader and organizational development.

Feasible: COA 3 is feasible as it does not require additional assets.

Acceptability: There is some risk associated with having a less modular force. However, this risk is far outweighed by the potential gains in leader development, training and training management.

Distinguishable: COA 3 is clearly distinguishable from other COAs.

Complete: COA 3 addresses the issue of organizational turbulence.

Summary of screening results: COA 3 provides a comprehensive solution to the issue of organizational turbulence. The only issue with COA 3 is that by restricting modularity to battalion level structures, there is a minor loss of flexibility which could result in some capabilities being deployed that are not required for a given contingency. This would result in transportation assets being tied to these capabilities that could have been used elsewhere. However, this would have a minimal effect overall due to the size of these units.

<div align="center">Course of Action 4: Development of Home
Station Battalion Structure</div>

Adequate: COA 4 has only a moderate impact on leader development. It fails to adequately address the issue of organizational turbulence.

Feasible: COA 4 would require significant additional assets.

Acceptability: COA 4 is not likely to have an impact substantial enough to justify the cost.

Distinguishable: COA 4 is distinguishable from the other COAs.

Complete: COA 4 does not completely address the issue of organizational turbulence.

Summary of screening results: COA 4 fails to meet the screening criteria of being adequate, feasible, acceptable, or complete. The analysis indicates there would be potential improvements in training and leadership; however, these improvements would not likely be substantial enough to justify the need for additional facilities. As a result, COA 4 will be dropped from further consideration.

Discarded Courses of Action

Only COA 4 is being discarded due to the fact that this COA failed to meet the screening criteria of adequate, feasible, acceptable, or complete. As a result, the potential benefits do not justify the cost.

Course of Action Evaluation

As stated in chapter 3, the method used to define each evaluation criterion is a rubric. "A rubric methodology paints a word picture that defines each criterion and establishes clear statements that benchmark how well a COA measures against all the criteria. A simple three-tiered measure defines these logical benchmarks: Optimal, Desirable, and Less Than Desirable."[39] The criterion that will be utilized will be cost, flexibility, stability, and effectiveness. Table 7 provides a summary of the criterion utilized in this study.

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[39]Kem, *Campaign Planning,* 105-107.

Table 7.   Evaluation Criteria Summary

Evaluation Criteria	Less Than Desirable	Desirable	Optimal
Cost	Costs more than the current system	Costs the same as the current system	Costs less than the current system
Flexibility	Greatly limits flexibility	Moderate effect on flexibility	Little or no effect on flexibility
Effectiveness	Resolves single aspect of the problem	Resolves some or most aspects of the problem	Resolves all aspects of the problem
Stability	Offers little or no change to level of organizational turbulence	Offers less than 50% decrease in organizational turbulence	Offers less than 50% decrease in organizational turbulence.

Source: Created by author, derived from MAJ Bryan Betty, "Recommendations For Army Force Generation Synchronization of The National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package" (Thesis, Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 December 2009), 55.

Course of Action 1: The Status Quo

Cost: COA 1 would not impact cost therefore it is desirable based upon the evaluation criterion.

Flexibility: COA 1 offers the full modularity and therefore offers the maximum flexibility in designing an EFP. Under the evaluation criteria this COA would be optimal.

Stability: COA 1 offers a low level of stability. The units of the sustainment brigade would have significant organizational turbulence with this COA. Under the evaluation criteria this COA would be less than desirable.

Effectiveness: As the status quo, this COA does not address the factors which lead to the current level of organizational turbulence and is therefore less than desirable.

Summary of evaluation: This COA is optimal in regards to flexibility and is desirable in terms of cost, but is not desirable in regards to stability or effectiveness. Figure 7 provides a sample ribbon chart demonstrating the level of organizational

turbulence expected with this COA. In the table, 29 UICs are depicted with a total of 26 in different ARFORGEN cycles:

	UIC	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
123 Sustainment Brigade	WH9TAA	Available				Deployed (OIF)							
STB	WH9TAB												
HHC	WH9TA1												
B Co (Sig)	WH9TA2												
95th HR	WP8SAA	Reset		Train/Ready									Available
Postal Plans and Ops	WP8SAB	Reset		Train/Ready									Available
R5 Platoon	WP8SAC	Deployed(OEF)		Reset		Train/Ready							
Casualty Platoon	WP8SAD	Deployed (OEF)		Reset			Train/Ready						
Cas 1	WP8SA1	Available	Deployed (OEF)										
Cas 2	WP8SA2	Deployed (OEF)											Reset
Cas 3	WP8SA3	Deployed (OIF)		Reset			Train/Ready						
Cas 4	WP8SA4	Deployed (OIF)					Reset			Train/Ready			
1st Postal Plt	WP8SAE	Reset			Train/Ready								
2nd Postal Plt	WP8SAF	Available	Deployed (OEF)										
3rd Postal Plt	WP8SAG	Deployed (OEF)							Reset				
12 FMC	WM9TAA	Deployed (OIF)		Reset			Train/Ready						
A Det FMC	WM9TAB	Train/Ready								Available	Deployed (OEF)		
B Det FMC	WM9TAC	Train/Ready								Available	Deployed (OIF)		
C Det FMC	WM9TAD	Deployed		Reset			Train/Ready						
432 CSSB	WH8RAA	Reset			Train/Ready								
21 QM	WH9PAA	Deployed		Reset			Train/Ready						
23 QM	WH7MAA	Train/Ready			Available				Deployed (OIF)				
45 ORD	WH9WAA	Train/Ready			Available		Deployed (OIF)						
592 FSC	WM7SAA	Available			Deployed (OEF)								
532 CSSB	WP8DAA	Available	Deployed (OEF)										
31 QM	WD6TAA	Reset	Train/Ready										
33 QM	WM9CAA	Deployed (OIF)		Reset			Train/Ready						
55 ORD	WJ8VAA	Available	Deployed (OEF)										
925 FSC	WP9DAA	Deployed (OEF)											Reset

Figure 12.   Course of Action 1-Ribbon Chart
Source: Created by author.

Course of Action 2: (Geography as Part of Sourcing Decision)

Cost: COA 2 would not impact cost therefore it is desirable based upon the evaluation criterion.

Flexibility: COA 2 would retain the current level of flexibility and is therefore optimal based upon the evaluation criterion.

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Stability: COA 2 offers a moderate increase in stability by reducing the level of turbulence for a segment of the force and is therefore desirable based upon the evaluation criterion.

Effectiveness: COA 2 does not address the entire force in a comprehensive manner due to units being in multiple stages of the ARFORGEN cycle. As such, COA 2 is singular in focus without comprehensive effects and would be classified as less than desirable.

Summary of evaluation: COA 2 is an optimal solution in regards to flexibility, is desirable it terms of cost and stability, but is less than desirable with regards to effectiveness. Figure 8 provides a sample ribbon chart demonstrating the level of organizational turbulence expected with this COA. In the table, 29 UICs are depicted with 20 in different ARFORGEN cycles, increasing stability by 23 percent.

Unit	UIC	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
123 Sustainment Brigade	WH9TAA	Available	Available	Available	Available	Deployed (OIF)							
STB	WH9TAB	Available	Available	Available	Available	Deployed (OIF)							
HHC	WH9TA1	Available	Available	Available	Available	Deployed (OIF)							
B Co (Sig)	WH9TA2	Available	Available	Available	Available	Deployed (OIF)							
95th HR	WP8SAA	Reset	Reset	Train/Ready									Available
Postal Plans and Ops	WP8SAB	Reset	Reset	Train/Ready									Available
R5 Platoon	WP8SAC	Deployed(OEF)			Reset	Reset	Train/Ready						
Casualty Platoon	WP8SAD	Deployed (OEF)		Reset	Reset	Train/Ready							
Cas 1	WP8SA1	Available	Available	Available	Available	Deployed (OIF)							
Cas 2	WP8SA2	Deployed (OEF)											Reset
Cas 3	WP8SA3	Deployed (OIF)	Reset	Reset	Reset	Train/Ready							
Cas 4	WP8SA4	Deployed (OIF)							Reset	Reset	Train/Ready		
1st Postal Plt	WP8SAE	Reset	Reset	Reset	Train/Ready								
2nd Postal Plt	WP8SAF	Available	Available	Available	Available	Deployed (OIF)							
3rd Postal Plt	WP8SAG	Deployed (OEF)								Reset	Reset	Reset	
12 FMC	WM9TAA	Deployed (OIF)	Reset	Reset	Reset	Train/Ready							
A Det FMC	WM9TAB	Train/Ready									Available	Deployed (OEF)	
B Det FMC	WM9TAC	Train/Ready									Available	Deployed (OIF)	
C Det FMC	WM9TAD	Deployed	Reset	Reset	Reset	Train/Ready							
432 CSSB	WH8RAA	Reset	Reset	Reset	Train/Ready								
21 QM	WH9PAA	Reset	Reset	Reset	Train/Ready								
23 QM	WH7MAA	Train/Ready			Available	Available	Available	Available	Available	Deployed (OIF)			
45 ORD	WH9WAA	Train/Ready			Available	Deployed (OIF)							
592 FSC	WM7SAA	Available	Deployed (OEF)										
532 CSSB	WP8DAA	Available	Deployed (OEF)										
31 QM	WD6TAA	Reset	Train/Ready										
33 QM	WM9CAA	Deployed (OIF)	Reset	Reset	Reset	Train/Ready							
55 ORD	WJ8VAA	Available	Deployed (OEF)										
925 FSC	WP9DAA	Available	Deployed (OEF)										

Figure 13.   Course of Action 2-Ribbon Chart

Source: Created by author.

Course of Action 3: (Permanent Attachment of Companies to Either the STB or CSSB)

Cost: COA 3 has the potential for a slight reduction of training cost related to TDY travel, but not enough to claim a major impact. Since COA 3 would not impact cost, therefore it is desirable based upon the evaluation criterion.

Flexibility: COA 3 would provide less flexibility to the commander and has the potential for unneeded capabilities to be deployed; however this would not be on a large scale. Based upon the evaluation criterion the impact on flexibility would be less than desirable.

Stability: COA 3 would have a major stabilizing effect and therefore is optimal based upon the evaluation criteria for stability.

Effectiveness: COA 3 holistically addresses the issue of organizational turbulence by reducing the level of modularity. Although there would be a decrease in the level of flexibility, there would be a sufficient level of flexibility to support the requirements of the combatant commander. Since this COA addresses the primary and secondary issues, this COA is optimal based upon the evaluation criterion for effectiveness.

Summary of evaluation: COA 3 was an optimal solution in regards to stability and effectiveness and a desirable solution in terms of cost. COA 3 is less than desirable with regards to flexibility. Figure 9 provides a Sample ribbon Chart demonstrating the level of organizational turbulence expected with this COA. In the table, 29 UICs are depicted with 3 in different ARFORGEN cycles, increasing stability by 88 percent:

	UIC	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
123 Sustainment Brigade	WH9TAA												
STB	WH9TAB												
HHC	WH9TA1												
B Co (Sig)	WH9TA2												
95th HR	WP8SAA												
Postal Plans and Ops	WP8SAB												
R5 Platoon	WP8SAC		Available					Deployed (OIF)					
1st Postal Plt	WP8SAE												
2nd Postal Plt	WP8SAF												
3rd Postal Plt	WP8SAG												
12 FMC	WM9TAA												
A Det FMC	WM9TAB												
B Det FMC	WM9TAC												
C Det FMC	WM9TAD												
432 CSSB	WH8RAA												
21 QM	WH9PAA												
23 QM	WH7MAA		Reset					Train/Ready					
45 ORD	WH9WAA												
592 FSC	WM7SAA												
532 CSSB	WP8DAA												
31 QM	WD6TAA												
33 QM	WM9CAA						Deployed (OEF)						
55 ORD	WJ8VAA												
925 FSC	WP9DAA	Available											

Figure 14.   Course of Action 3-Ribbon Chart
Source: Created by author.

The final step before selecting a likely solution is COA comparison. The COA

Comparison in table 8 uses the strengths and weakness of each solution from the rubric

developed in chapter 3. Once the comparative analysis is complete, a second table sums

up the comparative evaluation outcomes to assist in rank ordering solutions and selecting

an overall solution.

Course of Action Comparison Analysis

Table 8 compares the three remaining COAs against each of the evaluation

criteria and against each other in order to determine the best solution to the problem.

Table 8.   Course of Action Comparison Analysis

Evaluation Criteria	COA 1- The Status Quo	COA 2- The Geography COA	COA 3- The Permanent Attachment COA
Cost	-No new equipment or additional personnel - No additional training costs	-No new equipment or additional personnel - No additional training costs	- No new equipment or additional personnel - Potential for cost reduction relating to TDY travel for training
Flexibility	- Offers full modularity giving the maximum opportunity to "tailor" the force	- Offers full modularity giving the maximum opportunity to "tailor" the force	-Would offer less flexibility by restricting modularity to BN level
Effectiveness	-Does not address the issue of organizational turbulence	-Would only reduce the level of organizational turbulence for a portion of the Force	- Places some constraints on modularity which would reduce organizational turbulence -Eliminates or minimizes the Secondary issues
Stability	- Does not improve stability	- Offers a moderate increase in stability	- Offers a major increase in stability

Source: Created by author, derived from MAJ Bryan Betty, "Recommendations For Army Force Generation Synchronization of The National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package" (Thesis, Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 December 2009), 55.

Course of Action Comparison Summary

Using the Less Than Desirable, Desirable, and Optimal benchmarks established in chapter 3, each COA's overall performance against established evaluation criteria is summarized. Table 9 is a COA comparison summary to show "which solution best solves the problem based on the evaluation criteria."[40]

Table 9. Course of Action Comparison Summary

Evaluation Criteria	COA 1- The Status Quo	COA 2- The Geography COA	COA 3- The Permanent Attachment COA
Cost	Desirable	Desirable	Desirable
Flexibility	Optimal	Optimal	Less Than Desirable
Stability	Less Than Desirable	Desirable	Optimal
Effectiveness	Less Than Desirable	Less Than Desirable	Optimal

Source: Created by author, derived from MAJ Bryan Betty, "Recommendations For Army Force Generation Synchronization of The National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package" (Thesis, Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 December 2009), 79.

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[40]Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 5-0, 2-13.

Conclusion

The next chapter, Conclusions and Recommendations, completes the analysis, concluding the step seven of the problem solving methodology (make and implement the decision). It is important to note that making and implementation are beyond the scope of this study and a recommendation will be made instead. Chapter 5 presents conclusions reached in the thesis and proceeds to rank order the determined solutions based on the rubric from chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of the recommended COAs in rank order and recommendations for further study.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

<u>Introduction</u>

The effects of the modular structure of the sustainment brigades coupled with the current ARFORGEN readiness model have led to a less than optimal environment for leader development, organizational development and unit training. While it is certain that the requirements presented by the current conflicts will undoubtedly present continual challenges to the optimization of training and development, there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation. Courses of action two and three presented in chapter 4 will better set the conditions for leader and organizational development as well as unit training. In addition, these courses of action could be implemented in a relatively simple manner, without the need for additional assets. This chapter completes the final step of the thesis methodology and provides a summary of the research and analysis. It presents conclusions and recommendations to resolve the thesis question as well as recommendations for further study.

Chapter 4 completed steps four, five, and six of the Army Seven Step Problem-Solving Model: generate options, analyze possible solutions, and compare possible solutions. The initial solution set contained six COAs, with two being discarded after the application of the screening criteria and another being incorporated into a previous COA. The remaining three COAs were then paired against the evaluation criteria rubric which identified each solution's strengths and weaknesses. Following the application of the evaluation rubric, the chapter concluded with a comparison of each solution and the results of the evaluation.

Research Conclusions

The COA comparison completed in chapter 4 provided two potential solutions for reducing the level of organizational turbulence experienced by the company level units of the sustainment brigade. COA 1 represented the status quo and would not reduce organizational turbulence. COA 2 and COA 3 each offered a reduction in the level of turbulence, but approached the issue from a different perspective and are therefore not mutually exclusive. COA 2 introduced geography as a consideration to be added to the sourcing process, While COA 2 would make the companies of the sustainment brigade organic to either the STB or a CSSB.

The current conflicts have increased the Army's deployment tempo and combatant commander requirements. Meeting these requirements with current levels of modularity present within the sustainment brigades, coupled with ARFORGEN, and the sourcing process have resulted in a high level of organizational turbulence. Changes need to be made to reduce the current level of organizational turbulence. Failure to do so will maintain the current training and developmental conditions found in the companies of the sustainment brigade that are less than optimal and may have long term consequences. This thesis proposes changes that will reduce the level of organizational turbulence, while still maintaining an adequate level of flexibility in forming the EFPs in support of combatant commander requirements. These recommendations will also set the conditions for enhanced leader and organizational development as well as unit training, which will better posture the sustainment brigades for future operations.

Of the three COAs examined only two offered a reduction in organizational turbulence which was the central issue in the study. As stated in the previous chapter, the final step of The Army Problem-Solving Model: make and implement the decision will be modified, with recommendations taking the place of a decision. In order to offer up the recommendations of the study, each of the COAs analyzed is rank ordered, first to last:

<u>1st Course of Action 3: Permanent Attachment
of Companies to Either the STB or CSSB</u>

With this COA, the human resources, financial management and field service companies would be permanently assigned to the STB, while the transportation, QM and field maintenance companies would be assigned to the CSSBs. In addition, the casualty assistance teams currently resident in the HR Company would be permanently assigned to the division, corps, ESC and TSC G1 sections that they deploy with. The remaining O1 and E7 positions would move to the sustainment brigade S1 section. This COA loses some flexibility, but significantly reduces organizational turbulence. By restricting modularity to battalion sized elements, the conditions would be set to better foster leader development, training and training management with the expected outcome being better trained and ready units. One drawback of this COA is that the potential exists for an unneeded capability to be deployed, tying up transportation assets that could be used better elsewhere. This negative aspect of this COA should be kept in perspective when looking at the potential scope of this issue and realize that it is relatively small, but bears mention.

This COA could be implemented almost immediately due to the fact that there would not be a requirement for additional personnel or facilities. As a result, the force design update that would be required to change the modified table of equipment would not have to go through the entire Force Design Update process and could be approved in a single fiscal year.

This is the optimal solution to effectively lower the level of organizational turbulence and set the conditions for enhanced leader and organizational development as well as unit training. While there would be a reduction in the level of flexibility, this COA would retain enough flexibility to tailor an EFP with the required capabilities to support of the combatant commander.

Table 10 provides a summary of the Permanent Attachment of Companies solution.

Table 10.   Course of Action Comparison Analysis

Evaluation Criteria		COA 3- The Permanent Attachment COA
Cost	Desirable	- No new equipment or additional personnel - Potential for cost reduction relating to TDY travel for TNG
Flexibility	Less Than Desirable	-Would offer less flexibility by restricting modularity to BN level
Effectiveness	Optimal	- Places some constraints on modularity -Eliminates or minimizes the Secondary issues
Stability	Optimal	- Offers a major increase in stability

Source: Created by author, derived from MAJ Bryan Betty, "Recommendations For Army Force Generation Synchronization of The National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package" (Thesis, Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 December 2009), 86.

<u>2nd Course of Action 2: Geography</u>
<u>as Part of the Sourcing Decision</u>

By adding geography into the decision cycle, units would be selected bases upon geography first and by dwell time second, which would allow a unit of the proper type to deploy with its home battalion HQ. By doing so, there would be an increased preservation of habitual relationships, reduced TDY costs, and a reduction of organizational turbulence.

The recommended method for implementing this COA is in conjunction with COA 3 which would allow a battalion HQ to deploy with its home station sustainment brigade on a more frequent basis which would further improve the environment for leader and organizational development and unit training.

While this solution does not address the issue of organizational turbulence in a holistic manner, it does represent an improvement. This COA could be incorporated in conjunction with COA 3 which would have a synergistic effect. Furthermore, this solution would be easy to incorporate due to the fact that FORSCOM has begun doing this in an informal manner. By formalizing this practice, it would streamline the sourcing process by eliminating the need for a separate conference with TSC, ESC, and sustainment brigade commanders. Table 11 offers a summary of the Geography as part of the sourcing process solution.

Table 11. Course of Action Comparison Analysis

Evaluation Criteria		COA 2- The Geography COA
Cost	Desirable	-No new equipment or additional personnel - No additional training costs
Flexibility	Optimal	- Offers full modularity giving the maximum opportunity to "tailor" the force
Effectiveness	Desirable	-Would only solve the issue of over modularity for a portion of the Force
Stability	Less Than Desirable	- Offers a moderate increase in stability

Source: Created by author, derived from MAJ Bryan Betty, "Recommendations For Army Force Generation Synchronization of The National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package" (Thesis, Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 December 2009), 86.

3rd Course of Action 1: The Status Quo

The current or "status quo" option would continue the practice of companies and in some cases platoons or squads having a separate deployable UIC. While this practice would retain the highest level of flexibility, it also has the highest level of organizational turbulence which does not represent the optimal situation for leader development or unit training. This is a less than desirable solution due to the fact that with the less than optimal environment for organizational and leader development or unit training, the potential exists for negative long term consequences to the force. While it is not possible to make a definitive statement of the outcome of continuing the current practices, the prospect of a generation of leaders and Soldiers being developed under these conditions is disconcerting. Table 12 is a summary of COA 1.

Table 12.   Course of Action Comparison Analysis

Evaluation Criteria		COA 1- The Status Quo
Cost	Desirable	-No new equipment or additional personnel - No additional training costs
Flexibility	Optimal	- Offers full modularity giving the maximum opportunity to "tailor" the force
Effectiveness	Less Than Desirable	-Does not address the issue of over modularity
Stability	Less Than Desirable	- Does not improve stability

Source: Created by author, derived from MAJ Bryan Betty, "Recommendations For Army Force Generation Synchronization of The National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package" (Thesis, Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 December 2009), 86.

Recommendations for Further Study

A COA that was not considered in this study was having a fixed task organization at the brigade level. The reason for this is that this would negate any gains that have been made with the modularity concept as a fixed structure would represent its antithesis. A second reason is that having a fixed sustainment brigade structure would in effect create a heavy and light brigade structure which would not likely be efficient in support of a light/heavy mix of BCTs. One potential solution would be to have a multi-component structure combining active component with reserve component or National Guard components which would augment the fixed active component structure. A possible model for this COA would be the round-out concept that was in place prior to Desert Storm in which an active component division would be "rounded out" with capabilities

from the National Guard. While there surely would be some obstacles in creating a multi-component structure, this approach would establish a fixed structure with the flexibility to support a mix of light and heavy forces.

Conclusion

This chapter completes the Army decision making process as well as the study. The analysis of the three COAs resulted in the recommendation that COA 3 (Permanent attachment of Companies to a STB or CSSB) be adopted. With a fixed structure at the battalion level, it would offer a significant reduction in organizational turbulence. This reduced turbulence would offer an environment which would better foster leader and organizational development through increased consistency and predictability. By having a fixed battalion, the companies would also benefit from having a battalion staff which would better synchronize training and training resources and improve overall unit training. This COA would also offer flexibility in support of deployed requirements.

In this study, COA 2 (adding geography to the sourcing process) is also being recommended for adoption in conjunction with COA 3. By making this modification to the sourcing process, there would be increased instances of CSSBs deploying with their home station sustainment brigade. This relatively simple step would capitalize on existing habitual relationships and further reduce the organizational turbulence of the sustainment brigades.

The final COA, the status quo, is not recommended. Failure to change the current level of organizational turbulence will continue the less-than-optimal environment for leader and organizational development and unit training. If this were to continue for an extended period of time there is the very real danger of long-term negative consequences.

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